The riots that took place in England in August 2011 have widely been described as destructive, senseless and without purpose. This article, taking inspiration from Michel Foucault's later work on revolt as counter-conduct, argues for a new understanding of how to read political expression and thereby calls for the riots to be thought differently, as a form of counter-conduct. This demands a new appreciation for the possibilities of revolt where spontaneous, impulsive, mundane and non-spectacular events like riots can be construed as political rather than purely criminal. It also opens up possibilities for how we might understand the ethos of the 'revolting subject'.
Introduction
a lens through which to view acts of refusal. 21 The lens magnifies the power relations of conducting power that regulate the individual of the Big Society into the right way to behave within society to be recognized as the right kind of active, responsible citizen.
The active citizen had recourse to the right channels for resistance -which involve exercise of her right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly through civilized channels. For instance, protest which disrupts public space by just being there, like the Occupy movement with which I make comparison later, is more palatable and does not 15 Ibid., p. 230. 16 Ibid., p. 165. See also B Golder, 'Foucault and result in the protestor being assumed to be only criminal. The active citizen does not need to riot. Moreover, she is not recognized as enacting a right to resist if she riots. She is not to inflict disorder.
England's 'Summer of Disorder''
22
The Riots in Popular Discourse
The 'summer of disorder' 23 took place between 6-10 August 2011, when several London boroughs (including Tottenham, Enfield, Walthamstow and Hackney) and cities across
England suffered violence, looting and arson. The first night of rioting took place after a peaceful protest by about 200 people outside Tottenham police station over the fatal police shooting of Mark Duggan, a 29-year old black man, which has since been ruled to be a 'lawful killing' in January 2014. 24 The event was claimed by the Independent Police
Complaints Commission to be part of an Operation [Trident] investigating gun crime within the black community. As The Guardian reported, 'all hell then broke loose'. 25 In parts of North London, the police reported disturbances on a scale that merited comparison with the Brixton Riots of 1981, also characterized by violence, boredom and spontaneous uprisings against years of repression by the police. 26 Similarly, 'copycat violence' took place in major cities such as Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester, and led to the riots being termed the 'UK Riots' or, more accurately still, the 'England Riots', rather than the 'London Riots'. 27 What made this 'Britain's most significant and widespread urban unrest in at least a generation'? 28 Whilst still only a small part of the population a substantial number of people, upwards of fifteen thousand, are thought to have taken part. it tells us a great deal about our ideological-political predicament and about the kind of society we inhabit, a society which celebrates choice but in which the only available alternative to enforced democratic consensus is a blind acting out.
Opposition to the system can no longer articulate itself in the form of a realistic alternative, or even as a utopian project, but can only take the shape of a meaningless outburst. 
The Riots as Counter-Conduct

What is Being Countered
The rioters, rather than performing only meaningless outburst, are refusing the conducting power of the police and the governmentality of responsibilisation. The refusal can be seen in how the rioter actually acts -which need not require (revolutionary) intention but can be prompted by impulse and even indifference. First, the riot counters police power as evidenced in violent police presence and racialised police tactics. 44 Violence, through the use of practices such as 'kettling', batons and horse charges to disperse crowds, has become 'the hallmark of policing across the world'. 45 The typical modality for those in power, as El-Enany argues, is to depoliticize the policing of 41 Ibid. radical protest by labeling it a crime (for instance, creating the offence of 'violent disorder' as happened through the 1986 Public Order Act). 46 The effect of this is to criminalise social conflict, so much so that protesters become not only criminal but an external threat, a terrorist threat which calls for heightened -and excessive -police response. 47 We are familiar with the images in London, Birmingham, Liverpool and at each moment of their lives, young people will be encouraged to be more engaged.
They are now emotionally attached to a community and the ethic of responsibility that has been freely accepted is now part of the youth's conscience. The values of NCS have been internalised and allow subjects to police themselves.
Just under half of the rioters in 2011 were aged 18 to 24, and 26% were aged between 10 to 17; these younger teenagers would thus have been ripe for NCS recruitment. The unattractive and undesirable choice they instead made to riot, or the indifference that they showed in perhaps making no choice but rioting simply out of boredom, reinforces the attractiveness and desirability of the volunteer and volunteerism.
'Those thugs we saw last week', Cameron commented, 'do not represent us, nor do they represent our young people -and they will not drag us down. 
Counter-Conduct and Crisis
The counter-conduct lens magnifies behavior that is acting otherwise and allows us to observe the way in which the rioter actually acts. In this way, we are able to see crisis.
Foucault's studies on counter-conduct exposed the effect of counter-conduct as leading to a crisis in the pastorate. 'Crisis' here refers to the gradual erosion of pastoral, or conducting, power. The counter-conduct of the rioters of London 2011 highlights a crisis on two levels: first, it shows the failure of the Big Society and the erosion of its ethic of responsibility, and a crisis in how policing is done; second, it draws attention to 74 communities that it will choose to ignore, unless to punish. The excessive punitive measures taken against 'the mob' were 'consistently framed as rational and appropriate responses to the "mindless criminality" that had emerged on the streets.' 81 Whole communities are 'punished, abandoned and chastised' 82 for the behavior of those who participated in the rioting. For instance, forcing communities out of social housing and assuming that the path to private housing will be easy shows not only an abandonment of responsibility on the part of the welfare state but also a chronic misunderstanding of poverty and the social hierarchy within conducting power. 83 Second, counter-conduct leads to the production of counter-communities as individuals/groups become increasingly disillusioned with conducting power. The riots, rather than being disparate actions of rival or competing 'gangs', have instead been described as a 'unifying experience' brought about by a common enemy, the police. 84 The production of 'marginalised' as opposed to 'affiliated' communities as a response to conducting power is an inevitable consequence of counter-conduct. 85 The media, court and government response to the riots stigmatized and criminalized whole communities and not only individuals who took part in the rioting. These now deviant communities, defined by blind acting out and mindless criminal behavior, rest in stark contrast to the ideal active communities of the Big Society. They are the counter-communitites, the inexistents, or abnormals, who must be regulated (i.e. punished). This regulatory relation of conducting power (i.e. the governmentality of policing and of the Big Society, which produces a right way to resist) represents a 'politics of discomfort' which is an 'affective positioning of [the urban poor] as those forever at the border, those produced as the other'. 86 We are uncomfortable with positioning 'suspicious subjects' 87 (here, suspicious because of their non-conformist, irresponsible behavior) within the mainstream of society -by, for instance, offering them (added) welfare benefits, access to the job market and to affordable education. The communities thus become managed to the extent that we label and understand them as outcasts -punishable with violence, rejected by the right communities of the Big Society because they are not behaving responsibly or enacting a type of resistance that might be considered civilized and 'proper'. The survival and growth of marginalised communities is an unexpected consequence of the counterconduct of the rioter -and hence one of the specificities of the riot. These specificities distinguish the riot from 'proper resistance' or civilized movements enacted by recognisable subjectivities, like Occupy.
The Specificity of the Riot
The Riot as a Spontaneous, Mundane Spectacle
Adopting a counter-conduct perspective means observing how the rioter actually acts, that is the specifics of her behavior. The rioter acts out a spontaneous, impulsive reaction to the conducting power of the state -which dictates the right way to live responsibly with threat of extreme punishment for behavior that does otherwise. Although spontaneous, the riot I suggest is still, despite being a spectacle, mundane in the sense that it is an expected response.
The idea that counter-conduct is an impulsive reaction suggests a spontaneity of 122 Occupy performed everyday space, was spectacular in a way the riots were not; Occupy made a statement in its call for 'alternatives'. 127 The riots created a more mundane (as in expected) though visually disturbing spectacle defined by the violence of arson, looting and assault; and the behavior was a being otherwise, that is countering being responsible or at least being indifferent to the duty to be so.
Conclusion
'What is going on? Of what are we the half-fascinated, half-devastated witnesses?
… the end of that world? The advent of a different world?'
128
'The enigma of revolts' 129 is particularly pertinent to the riot since it is difficult to understand both how to label this kind of revolt and how to understand the ethos of the revolting subject. I have proposed here that we label the revolt as counter-conduct.
Thinking the riot in this way, that is adopting the counter-conduct framework, allows for telling a different story to the one that says the riots were only destructive and senseless, and that villainises the rioter. The different story allows us to see the political agency of the rioter, her struggle and the counter-narrative of the struggle of her community, and indeed to recognise the development of counter-communities as a consequence of revolt.
The counter-conduct framework provides a useful theoretical tool by which to analyse 
